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Recension  
Michael Sohn, The Good of Recognition: Phenomenology, Ethics, and Religion in the 
Thought of Lévinas and Ricœur (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2014), 
pp. 160. 
The focus of Michael Sohn’s book is “the treatment of the Hegelian concept of recognition 
(Anerkennung)” in the works of Emmanuel Lévinas and Paul Ricœur (ix). Sohn’s objective is 
twofold: (a) he wants to show that this Hegelian concept is to be found throughout their works, 
which in Ricœur’s case means from as early as Karl Jaspers et la philosophie de l’existence (1947) and 
Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers: Philosophe du mystère et philosophe du paradoxe (1948) right through to 
Parcours de la reconnaissance (2004); and (b) he wants to construct an argument in support of the 
claim that the concept of recognition “plays an important role in their thought at the intersection 
of phenomenology, ethics, politics, and religion” (ix).  
Sohn clearly has very definite views on the best way to proceed when interpreting 
Lévinas’ and Ricœur’s works and in particular their thoughts on recognition. He insists that they 
can be properly understood only “by situating them within the philosophical and theological 
context of the day” (1). If by “philosophical and theological context” he means intellectual 
context, Sohn’s approach is not dissimilar to that of Quentin Skinner. Indeed, the experience of 
reading Sohn’s book is not very different from listening to Skinner lecture on Hobbes. Sohn and 
Skinner both offer scholarly accounts of the intellectual resources that were available to the 
named philosophers (Sohn’s Lévinas and Ricœur and Skinner’s Hobbes) when they set about 
addressing an issue that was of concern to them (Lévinas’ and Ricœur’s desire to bring an end to 
“social discrimination and political persecution” (1) and Hobbes concern to legitimize a particular 
form of government). As is well known, Skinner takes this approach with a view to reaching a 
historical understanding of texts and concepts, eschewing any suggestion that what he is dealing 
with are timeless philosophical works or deracinated concepts. And the same could be said of 
Sohn even if he is more inclined to underscore the second term in the phrase, “historical 
understanding”: “This study has employed a historical and analytical approach to understanding 
the concept of recognition in Emmanuel Lévinas’ and Paul Ricœur’s works” (123). 
In the opening chapter of the book Sohn notes that “Emmanuel Lévinas and Paul Ricœur 
belonged to a generation that experienced acute feelings of both nonrecognition and 
misrecognition” (1). These feelings arose in the context of witnessing and experiencing “the 
[modern] malaise of anonymity,” and “invidious forms of social discrimination and political 
persecution.” Sohn then goes on to discuss “the intellectual sources” that were available to 
Lévinas and Ricœur when they first began to articulate their responses to “these social and 
political forces.” On Sohn’s account, the primary intellectual source was Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit as it was interpreted by French commentators in the 1930s and 1940s. The account he offers 
of the “main thinkers and their arguments” (3) sets the scene for a demonstration of the extent to 
which the early intellectual biographies of Lévinas and Ricœur intersect with certain “towering 
figures in French thought” (5). Sohn points out that Lévinas attended Alexandre Koyré’s 
seminars on Hegel in the 1930s; and it was Koyré who supervised his translation of Edmund 
Eileen Brennan 
 
 
Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies     
Vol 6, No 2 (2015)    ISSN 2155-1162 (online)    DOI 10.5195/errs.2015.314    http://ricoeur.pitt.edu   
155 
 
155 
 
Husserl’s Cartesianische Meditationen. He also notes that Lévinas’ doctoral studies were supervised 
by Jean Wahl. However, the evidence that Sohn produces in support of the claim that “Ricœur’s 
early intellectual biography intersects with the key figures who contributed to the revival of 
Hegel studies in France” (8) is less compelling. He points to Ricœur’s acknowledgement that 
Kojève’s interpretation of Hegelian phenomenology played a role in opening “the way for all the 
anthropological applications of dialectics which were incorporated into French phenomenology” 
(quoted on page 8). Ricœur’s own phenomenology would clearly fall into that category. Sohn 
finds some additional support for his claim in a statement that Ricœur makes regarding the 
contribution that the return to “the Hegel of the Phenomenology of Spirit” made to French 
philosophy in general. But, apparently unable to find evidence of any personal connection 
between Ricœur and the great French interpreters of Hegel, Sohn turns to the content of 
“Ricœur’s personal library” (n.8) where, as he observes, there are copies of works by Kojève, 
Hyppolite, and Wahl to be found. 
Sohn is probably on more solid ground when he declares that Ricœur was not interested 
in establishing what Hegel “really said,” but wanted to bring “the insights of recent Hegel studies 
in critical conversation […] with the thought of Karl Jaspers and Edmund Husserl” (8). He will 
devote the fourth chapter of his book to discussing the manner in which Ricœur brought 
existentialism and phenomenology together, claiming that this synthesis effectively “rearticulated 
and reinterpreted Hegel’s concept of Anerkennung” (11). However, before he gets to that point he 
wants to outline a second category of intellectual source that was available to Lévinas and Ricœur 
at the start of their intellectual journeys: “theological sources.” Under that heading, Sohn 
endeavours to situate Lévinas’ thought “within a certain social and political history of Jewish life 
in France during the nineteenth and early twentieth century,” the objective being to understand 
what was at stake in Lévinas’ “reconceptualization of recognition” (12). As Sohn presents him, 
Lévinas was concerned for the future of Judaism, which he believed hinged “not so much on the 
struggle for political existence but primarily on the cultivation of […] cultural Judaism” (13-4). 
Similarly, Sohn tries to situate Ricœur’s thought “within the Protestant Christian tradition” (14). 
He notes that, like Lévinas, Ricœur “holds a strong commitment to universal political and legal 
recognition while at the same time cultivating and renewing particular religious identity” (15). 
Sohn devotes Chapters Two and Three to an examination of Lévinas’ understanding and 
use of the concept of recognition. He discusses Ricœur’s understanding and use of the same 
“Hegelian concept” in Chapters Four and Five. The argument presented in Chapter Two echoes 
the approach to interpreting Lévinas made famous by Jean-Luc Marion. That is to say, it proceeds 
on the assumption that there is “a series of reductions” in Lévinas’ phenomenology, which 
ultimately leads to “his distinct concept of recognition” (n.20). The first of the reductions leads 
the researcher back from naturalistic theories to “the Husserlian phenomenological theory of 
cognition,” a staging post that, for Lévinas at least, has both “insights and oversights” (20). The 
second reduction takes the inquiry back beyond the problems of abstraction and solipsism that 
Lévinas identifies in an otherwise insightful Husserlian phenomenology to a “primarily 
axiological and practical” version of the same method (25), i.e., Lévinas’ own.  
Sohn’s accounts of Husserl’s critique of naturalism and Lévinas’ critical appropriation of 
Husserlian phenomenology are examples of the very finest expository writing. Most readers will 
certainly feel that they have learned something about those challenging topics after reading 
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Sohn’s accounts. However, it is his account of “Lévinas’ ethical understanding of the recognition 
of the other” (29) that is likely to prove the most thought provoking. “For heuristic purposes” 
Sohn elucidates that phenomenon “by considering [its] ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ aspects” (29). 
Commenting on the latter, he notes that Lévinas entertained “a much broader construal of 
[Descartes’] ego cogito – and thus a much broader understanding of subjectivity and cognition” 
(34) than Kant had done. He writes: “Within this broadened interpretation of the ego cogito and 
its multiple modalities, including will, perception, memory, imagination, and judgment, Lévinas 
highlights the place of sensation” (35). He acknowledges that Lévinas was following Husserl’s 
lead when he adopted a broad interpretation of the ego cogito. But he argues that in doing so he 
discovered “a primordial notion of subjectivity” that had been neglected by Husserl and others: 
“Not only is sensation merely one among many modes of the ego cogito but, on his reading of 
Descartes, it is also the most primordial and fundamental” (35).  
When Sohn underscores the importance of Descartes’ Second Meditation for Lévinas’ 
conceptualization of subjectivity as sensation he not only clarifies one side of Levinas’ ethical 
understanding of the recognition of the other, he also establishes “an important point of 
comparison when considering the thought of Ricœur, who employs his own method of 
reduction, but to the modality of the will” (35). Chapter Four sets out to demonstrate that 
Ricœur’s early writings, “from roughly the late 1940s to the 1960s,” are crucial to understanding 
his later work on the ethics of recognition (67). Sohn argues that those early writings see Ricœur 
appropriate “the Hegelian concept of Anerkennung through the new approaches and insights in 
the existentialism of Karl Jaspers and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl” (67). However, 
this line of argumentation tends to obscure the exciting point of comparison with Lévinas. 
Instead of focusing attention on the way Ricœur leads the reflection back to subjectivity as will, it 
obliges Sohn to analyze the way Ricœur uses Jaspers’ “magisterial three-volume work entitled 
simply Philosophy” as a resource for articulating a reaction against “‘the philosophy of things’ and 
the ‘philosophy of ideas’” (69). But as Sohn acknowledges, Jaspers’ work “only briefly alludes to 
the notion of the will and the question of voluntary and involuntary acts. Ricœur develops the 
issue of the will and significantly complicates Jaspers’ notion of freedom through the insights of 
phenomenology” (72-3). Sohn’s subsequent analysis of Le volontaire et l’involontaire (1950) 
suggests that it was “Husserlian phenomenology” that allowed Ricœur to integrate “the 
voluntary and the involuntary” aspects of the will (73). However, this may be to downplay the 
extent of innovation in Ricœur’s reconciling freedom with such heterogeneous regions as the 
body and the unconscious. It certainly serves to further obscure the promising comparison that 
Sohn wants to make between Lévinas and Ricœur. Indeed, the better approach might have been 
to emphasize the degree to which Ricœur followed Lévinas in critiquing “Husserlian 
phenomenology” through the use of a signature reappraisal of Descartes’ Second Meditation.  
As I already mentioned, Chapter Four sets out to demonstrate that Ricœur’s early 
writings, “from roughly the late 1940s to the 1960s,” are crucial to understanding his later work 
on the ethics of recognition (67). Sohn holds that, “Recognition is a central, connecting thread 
throughout Ricœur’s works from his early writings on descriptive phenomenology of recognition 
through his later prescriptive ethics of recognition and what might be called his ‘politics of 
recognition,’” claiming that, for Ricœur, “The ethics of mutual recognition […] is inextricably 
linked to the issue of the constitution of selfhood and the overarching problematic of capacities 
and human freedom” (93). This is undoubtedly the case. However, Sohn does not appear to place 
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any weight on Ricœur’s suggestion that “recognition as identification,” “recognizing oneself” and 
“mutual recognition” are three distinct concepts stemming from three very different sources. As 
Ricœur clearly demonstrates in The Course of Recognition, “recognition as identification” is the 
Kantian concept of Rekognition; “recognizing oneself” is the Bergsonian concept of reconnaissance; 
and “mutual recognition” is the Hegelian concept of Anerkennung. It seems to me that it is 
important to keep this complex genealogy in mind when considering the sources of Ricœur’s 
thought and his philosophy of recognition in particular. Of course, to be fair, Ricœur did indicate 
that there was an “unsaid” hidden in the “folds” of both the meaning of “recognition as 
identification” and the meaning of “recognizing oneself,” which would seem to suggest that his 
primary objective, in The Course of Recognition, was to unfold the hidden concept of “mutual 
recognition.” This could be viewed as support for the line of inquiry that Sohn has taken. But, for 
me, there is still a question to consider with regard the point that Ricœur was making when he 
presented such an elaborate system of meanings with its diverse genealogical sources: Kantian, 
Bergsonian and Hegelian. Although the system reminds one of the Russian nesting doll or 
Matryoshka, one is probably not entirely at liberty to discard the first and second meanings in 
order to focus exclusively on the third, examining its provenance and discussing the way it has 
been re-conceptualized. 
Criticisms apart, this is a very exciting book. Its sophisticated and scholarly approach 
facilitates a genuine understanding of two seminal appropriations of the Hegelian concept of 
recognition; it provides valuable insights into the French reception and critical appropriation of 
Husserlian phenomenology; and it establishes interesting connections between the philosophical 
and theological writings of two major figures in continental philosophy. It will surely make a 
significant contribution to the secondary literature on both Lévinas and Ricœur. 
